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FILE *Committee 14*

10 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Administration  
Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

SUBJECT: DCI Security Committee (U)

1. (U) Action Requested: This memorandum requests that you reassign the resources and responsibilities of the DCI Security Committee staff from the Intelligence Community staff to the Office of Security.

2. (C) Background: In response to the concern of the President of the United States regarding the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence on 24 March 1959 established a standing Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board. The committee was initially assigned the mission of promoting means by which the Intelligence Community might prevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence, intelligence information and intelligence sources and methods. The Security Committee was initially chaired by the Deputy Director of Security, CIA; subsequently, the chairmanship was occupied by the Director of Security, CIA until 1974.

(C) The mission of the USIB Security Committee over the years has expanded so that it now covers a spectrum of policy formulation and Community-support responsibilities. In the 1974 Intelligence Community reorganization, the committee was established as a standing DCI Security Committee. At the same time the position of chairman was placed in the Intelligence Community staff and modest but dedicated personnel resources were assigned to support its operation. Since 1974, the reconstituted DCI Security Committee has been chaired sequentially by two retired FBI and State Department officers, working less than full time and serving in concurrent capacities as the Chairman of the Security Committee and as a staff member of the Intelligence

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Community Staff. The most recent chairman resigned from this position on 30 September 1977 to accept employment in private industry. The Executive Secretary of the Security Committee (a CIA employee) is currently serving as Acting Chairman of the Committee.

3. (U) Staff Position: The fact that the organization of the Intelligence Community is once again in the process of change, coupled with the unexpected resignation of the Security Committee Chairman, provides an opportunity to examine:

- a. Whether there is a continued need for a DCI Security Committee;
- b. If so, what purpose should it serve;
- c. Organizationally, how best it can serve this purpose.

This memorandum provides a view concerning these issues and recommends a proposed course of action.

(U) The Need for a Security Committee: The National Security Act of 1947 assigns to the Director of Central Intelligence a responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This responsibility was reiterated in Executive Order 11905 dated 18 February 1976, which directed that the DCI shall "ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures." E.O. 11905 also directed that the DCI "ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence Community, of common security standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and products, and for granting access thereto."

(C) In addition to the establishment of the Security Committee in 1959, which limited its activities to non-compartmented access early on, there were significant other parallel developments. In August 1960 the President assigned responsibility to the Director of Central Intelligence for determining all questions involved in the continued protection and control of products from strategic reconnaissance programs. Additionally, in 1961, by agreement with the Department of Defense, establishment and monitoring of

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security policy for nationally funded collection programs was vested in the Director. In each case this responsibility was delegated to the Office of Security, CIA. In addition the Office of Security, CIA has operated, as a service of common concern, a central repository of records pertaining to the requesting and granting of all compartmented access approvals in both the collection and product area.

(U) The Security Committee in accordance with its charter has also been active in the policy formulation area and especially in recent years has addressed the problems of compartmentation security. Thus, traditionally, the DCI has been supported jointly by the Office of Security, CIA and the Security Committee organization in carrying out his responsibilities for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The Office of Security, CIA and the Security Committee structure have also made major contributions in other areas, not the least of which concern unauthorized intelligence disclosures. This problem, which itself gave birth to the Security Committee in 1959, has persisted, probably with more at stake today than ever before.

(U) Policy issues associated with the DCI's responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods run the gamut from investigative and adjudicative standards for approving access to intelligence material to the establishment of common physical security requirements for protecting intelligence information. Among the several aspects of these issues are computer security policy, industrial security policy, compartmentation, disclosure policy to the public and to friendly foreign liaison.

(U) In order to address all these issues it is believed that the DCI at the very least needs a senior security advisor who can support him in looking at the issues from a total Community standpoint against a background of overall federal security policy. Because the formulation and implementation of intelligence security policy cannot effectively be done in a vacuum or from an ivory tower, it is believed that this senior security advisor needs a forum of communications with and among the separate security components of the Intelligence Community. It is felt that a Security Committee chaired by the senior security referent to the DCI is the necessary vehicle to provide such support to the Director in this area. There is, therefore, a continued need for a DCI Security Committee.

(U) Purpose and Function: In examining what purpose and mission should be served by the Security Committee, it is difficult to separate the roles of the Committee and its chairman, who would concurrently serve as the senior security advisor to the DCI. In order to define purpose and mission, the roles of the Committee chairman and DCI advisor may be considered one. In addition functions being performed in a single Community component but on behalf of the Community as a whole must be integrated into the overall analysis.

(U) The 1959 mission of the USIB Security Committee related to the prevention of unauthorized intelligence disclosures; in 1959 the Security Committee was established to assist in the development of security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence. In 1977 the purpose of a Security Committee or a security advisor to the DCI would be one of assistance to the Director in carrying out his responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The purpose has not changed in 18 years.

(C) The mission and functions of a Security Committee and senior security advisor to the DCI would fall into two areas, in which the Security Committee and the Office of Security, CIA have traditionally been active. The first relates to the formulation of security policies, standards and procedures governing the protection of intelligence materials and information. The second involves services of common concern to the Intelligence Community provided to support the protection of intelligence. Policy formulation areas include the creation and maintenance of physical security standards, uniform compartmentation procedures, adequate personnel investigative and adjudicative standards, computer security policy, industrial security standards, a uniform policy with regard to the disclosure of intelligence information both to the public and to friendly foreign liaison. Services of common concern would include the operation of centralized records for compartmented access approvals and accredited compartmented facilities, centralized monitoring of the security of intelligence information in the industrial environment, coordination and centralized record keeping with respect to unauthorized disclosures of intelligence information and maintenance of the Intelligence Community's training facility in technical surveillance countermeasures.

(C) There are two other areas into which the Security Committee, properly supported and managed by a senior DCI security advisor might move to advantage. The first relates to the coordination of security programs with the Intelligence Community; the second involves the ability of the Intelligence Community to speak with a single voice on security issues to elements outside it.

(C) The purpose of central coordination would be to assign responsibility especially in security research efforts to individual Community members while at the same time ensuring that proper funding were made available for such efforts as a Community objective. Such coordination would also inhibit pursuit of duplicative or overlapping efforts by different Community members; it would also tend to encourage the sharing of knowledge concerning such efforts, be they successful or not.

(U) The other area of new initiative which has promise of value concerns the need for Intelligence Community activities to relate more to the overall federal security structure in which, by necessity, it operates. In this area there are several good examples where the need exists. Executive Order 10450 has been in use for several years as the reference for determining the security suitability of federal employees; efforts to revise and update this standard over the past two years were carried out a good part of the way without contribution from the Intelligence Community. The Executive Order currently being drafted to replace E.O. 11652 and to define new requirements for the management of classified information necessitates continuing dialogue between the Intelligence Community and the General Services Administration, which will be responsible for policing these new requirements throughout the Executive Branch. Over the past two years, and especially in recent months, the Intelligence Community is making available to the Congress more and more of its information. While most of the liaison efforts concerning the protection of such intelligence information provided the Congress to date has involved CIA, it is already known that the security arrangements and agreements associated with the release of such material to Congress need a Community approach.

(C) In summary the purpose of the Security Committee would be to support the Director of Central Intelligence

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with respect to the protection of intelligence sources and methods by:

- a. Formulating and recommending security policy standards and procedures for intelligence information and materials;
- b. Providing and managing for the Intelligence Community security services of common concern;
- c. Acting as a focal point for the Intelligence Community in security policy matters as they relate to overall government policies; and
- d. Coordinating security research and development efforts of the Intelligence Community for purposes of defining requirements, assigning priorities, eliminating duplication and recommending adequate funding.

(C) Organizational Options: The analysis thus far suggests the continued need for a Security Committee chaired by an individual who would concurrently act as the senior security advisor to the DCI; necessarily the chairman would have at least a modest staff to meet Committee demands. In addition he would, or the DCI would, have to rely on additional staff support from Community members, especially the Office of Security, CIA to render services of common concern. An examination of the organizational alternatives associated with this model and designed to handle the four functions identified above suggests the following:

- a. Positioning the chairman in the Intelligence Community Staff with modest personnel resources to administratively support the Committee (status quo).
- b. Assigning the chairmanship to the CIA Director of Security to function concurrently as the senior DCI security advisor, Chairman of the DCI Security Committee, and Director of Security, CIA; in the first two of these capacities he would enjoy modest but distinct staff support composed of Security personnel from both CIA and other Intelligence Community agencies as well as indirect support from those elements of the CIA Office of Security now providing security services of common concern to the Community.
- c. Establishing the chairmanship with staff support and with direct reporting responsibility to the DCI.

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d. Creating a rotating chairmanship among the security components of the Intelligence Community with the Agency serving as pro tem chairman having responsibility for providing administrative support to the Committee.

(C) Option A: This option would continue the option of 1974. It would tend to perpetuate a division of responsibility in Community security policy matters between Intelligence Community Staff and the Office of Security, CIA, especially in the compartmentation area. It would also rely completely on individual Community security components, especially in CIA for the provision of services of common concern, e.g. the operation of the Interagency Training Center, the function of centralized record keeping on compartmented access approvals. As heretofore, this alternative might leave the chairman vulnerable to the individual prejudices of members in achieving support for projects undertaken by the Committee. In short, this operation does not lend itself to a strong chairmanship. On the other hand this operation would emphasize the Community nature of the Committee by the chairman's disassociation from CIA.

(C) Option B: Positioning the chairmanship within CIA would tend to integrate Security Committee activities with the Community security support functions CIA has always pursued. It would also create a position of senior security advisor to the DCI who could simultaneously act and speak from an Agency and a Community standpoint. It would allow the chairman to use the full security resources of the Agency more efficiently on programs and efforts of Community interest. This option might project the image that the Office of Security, CIA was imposing its security rigor upon the Community as a whole. However, among the security components of the Community this might not be considered universally as a disadvantage in view of the generally stricter security requirements of the CIA program. In addition, such an image would be mellowed by the on-site assignment to the support staff of personnel from agencies other than CIA.

(C) Option C: Assigning to the Security Committee chairman a direct reporting responsibility to the DCI obviously strengthens the position of that individual and the Committee to pursue an effective program. On the other hand it would tend to create two Directors of Security in

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the overall national intelligence organization: a Director for CIA, the operating base of the Director; and a second super-Director of Security on the DCI's immediate staff. A Security Committee chairman position at this level would enjoy greater and closer communication with the DCI, thus being able to manage Security Committee activities more responsively to these requirements. However, the Chairman would have to continue to rely on the Office of Security, CIA for common concern support.

(C) Option D: This option would result in the weakest type of Security Committee functioning. It would encourage an approach to Committee activities more informal than the other options and almost certainly less productive. The environment of the Security Committee under this option would be more of a model of a Committee operation in the pejorative sense, in that the position of chairman would be temporary, transitory and weak. It would be a club type environment and runs the risk of member agencies holding back on necessary or desirable programs until they could capture the chair to enhance achieving what they perceived as being in the best interests of their own organization.

4. (C) Recommendation: In view of the efficiency and centralization of resources which can be delivered to the DCI, it is recommended that you adopt Option B and assign the Chairmanship of the DCI Security Committee to the Director of Security, CIA on a permanent basis.

  
Robert W. Gambino

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

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